El Paso Water confronts systemic isolation risks following 36-inch main failure
El Paso Water Utilities, Texas · Meeting date: February 11, 2026 · Published: February 12, 2026
An operational review initiated after a catastrophic line break has highlighted isolation challenges affecting 260 miles of transmission mains and underscored the complexities of maintaining the city’s 52,000 valves.
Key points
- The inability to quickly isolate a recent 36-inch main break was attributed to numerous small-diameter interconnections that complicated valve operations.
- Management revealed that 260 miles of the utility’s 500 miles of large-diameter pipe share this legacy design, posing similar isolation risks.
- The utility is installing four new valves at the break site using line stops and has scheduled a condition assessment with Pure Technologies for the summer.
- Board discussion highlighted the high cost of valve replacement, with large diameter units costing up to $200,000 each.
Full report
El Paso Water is reassessing its transmission system management strategies after an analysis of a recent 36-inch water main break in Northeast El Paso revealed significant challenges in isolating large-diameter pipelines.
During the February 11, 2026, Public Service Board meeting, Gilbert Trejo, Vice President for Operations and Technical Services, provided a detailed post-mortem of the incident involving the Nevins 36-inch discharge line. Trejo explained that the primary difficulty in isolating the break stemmed from the pipeline’s legacy design, which features multiple smaller distribution lines connected directly to the transmission main. This configuration required crews to close a high number of valves to stop the flow of water, rather than just isolating a specific segment.
Trejo reported that this configuration is prevalent throughout the city’s infrastructure. Of the utility's 3,000 miles of pipeline, approximately 500 miles are considered large diameter (20 inches or larger). Of those 500 miles, roughly 260 miles feature the same "multiple connection" design that complicated the recent response. "That condition... exists under these larger thoroughfares all over the city," Trejo told the board, noting that while modern best practices involve laying parallel "piggyback" lines to minimize transmission interconnections, the older design was standard practice for decades to reduce costs.
The incident also brought scrutiny to the utility's valve maintenance program. Trejo noted that the valves at the break site had been exercised as recently as November 2024, though results were mixed, with some failing to seal or reopen completely. The utility manages 52,000 valves citywide, including 3,000 large-diameter valves. Replacing a single buried large-diameter valve can cost between $150,000 and $200,000, creating significant budgetary pressure for the asset management program.
In response to the break, the utility is installing four additional valves on the affected segment using line stops to allow installation while the pipe remains in service. One valve has already been installed, with three more pending. Additionally, the utility has mobilized Pure Technologies under an existing master contract to conduct a condition assessment of the line this summer. This evaluation is expected to leverage non-disruptive inline inspection tools, such as the acoustic SmartBall or electromagnetic PipeDiver, which are capable of pinpointing leaks and structural distress in large-diameter mains without requiring service interruptions.
Board member Stefanie Block Uribarri acknowledged the community's frustration following the event, distinguishing between the public's gratitude for the field crews and their dissatisfaction with the administrative response. "Any frustration that occurred... was never directed towards the on-the-ground response," she said, emphasizing the need for the board to review lessons learned regarding communication and management.
Trejo confirmed that the utility is updating its standard operating procedures to better assess valving and isolation strategies during emergency responses, acknowledging that the complexity of the interconnections at the break site was not fully appreciated by field crews initially.
This summary was generated by AI based on the source document and may contain errors.
Source: Public Service Board Meeting, El Paso Water Utilities